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A Taxonomy on Constitutional Court Appointment Mechanisms in Federal Countries
MOLLY MADDEN*
INTRODUCTION
A federal country is a union of partially self-governing regions, whether those regions are
provinces or states, where the regions are unified under a central federal government; there are
between twenty-five and thirty-three federal countries in the world.1 The division of power
between the regions and the central government is often delineated in a country’s constitution and
varies from country to country. Countries differ in how they decide federal disputes meaning
questions about the country’s fundamental federative structure, such as sharing legislative powers,
the constitutional amendment procedure, the legal status of the federal and state entities, or the
territory of a federated entity and its authority to secede.2 These issues are often decided by
Constitutional or Supreme Courts. The amount of state input in the appointment of judges to these
courts varies.
This paper provides a taxonomy of how federal countries appoint judges to their highest
courts. Appointment mechanisms involve (1) little or no meaningful input from state government,
(2) the states acting in an indirect role, or (3) substantial state government input. Within-group
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Eugenie Brouillet, The Supreme Court of Canada: The Concept of Cooperative Federalism and Its Effect on the
Balance of Power in COURTS IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES: FEDERALISTS OR UNITARISTS? 135 n. 1 (Nicholas Aroney &
John Kincaid eds., 2017).

one, countries that allow for little to no meaningful input from state governments, some countries
require that one federal body check another federal body during the appointment process, such as
the federal executive’s nominees are confirmed by the federal senate. I first evaluate which court
or entity in each country answers federalism questions, whether that is a Constitutional Court,
Supreme Court, or a commission. I then look at how members of that body are appointed and
evaluate that procedure for level of state input.
I.

COUNTRIES WITHOUT MEANINGFUL STATE INPUT IN THE APPOINTMENT PROCESS

The majority of countries do not allow the states or provinces substantial input into the
appointment process for selecting judges onto their highest courts. A lack of substantial input
from the states is defined by the federal government playing the primary role in appointment
mechanisms. Representatives from a few states may be consulted, but that consultation is not a
requirement, or a federal officer or body may appoint judges without any input from the states.
Many countries require that one federal body gain approval from another federal body before
appointments are made; however, the state governments are not involved in this process.
Countries in this category include: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Comoros, Ecuador,
India, Malaysia, Mexico, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, United States of America,
and Venezuela.
A. Argentina
Argentina is a federal country that has been defined by a very strong federal or central
government.3 The National Supreme Court of Justice decides issues of federalism in Argentina.4
Under the Constitution of Argentina, the President of the Nation appoints Supreme Court judges,

3

Antonio M. Hernandez, Republic of Argentina in 3 A GLOBAL DIALOGUE ON FEDERALISM: LEGISLATIVE,
EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIAL GOVERNANCE IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES 9 (Katy Le Roy & Cheryl Saunders eds., 2006).
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with the consent of the Senate with two-thirds of its members present, in a public session
convened for that purpose.5 The appointment process for lower federal judges was amended
through the National Territory Act to increase the independence of the judiciary; however, the
establishment of the Council of the Magistracy did not change the appointment procedures for
the National Supreme Court of Justice.6 The judiciary is largely viewed as controlled by the
office of the President. The President has been able to control the composition of the Supreme
Court.7 The governments of the states or regions of Argentina have no role in this appointment
process.
B. Australia
In Australia, one federal government agent ultimately controls the appointment process.
The High Court of Australia settles federal disputes.8 The several justices of the High Court are
appointed by the Queen’s representative, the Governor-General,9 who is appointed by the Queen
from the prime minister’s recommendation.10 The Governor-General must consult members of
the federal government before appointments are made, specifically, the Federal AttorneyGeneral.11 The Federal Attorney-General is viewed as the true decision-maker in appointments.12
The High Court of Australia Act 1979 requires that the Federal Attorney-General consults with
the State Attorneys-General; however, only the consultation is required. The Commonwealth or
Federal Attorney-General is not required to seek the approval of the State Attorneys-General.13
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Art. 99, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC] (Arg.).
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Hernandez, supra note 3, at 21.
8
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Additionally, the Commonwealth Attorney-General consults with many other members of the
government and legal profession.14 Thus, the states do not have a large role in this process.
Consultation with the states’ representatives allows them a minimal voice especially considering
that their approval is not necessary.
C. Brazil
In Brazil, the federal government has total control over the appointment process, but one
federal body has to approve the federal executive appointees. The Supreme Federal Tribunal
addresses federal disputes in Brazil.15 Ministers of the Supreme Federal Tribunal are appointed
by the President of the Republic, with approval of an absolute majority of the Federal Senate.16
The 81-seat Federal Senate is composed of three representatives from each state and the Federal
District. These representatives are directly elected by their constituents.17 Thus, the President
nominates but cannot appoint without approval from the Senate. This does not allow for any
meaningful input from state governments.
D. Canada
The Canadian appointment process is very similar to that of Australia and similarly
provides minimal state representation and input. The Supreme Court of Canada decides issues of
federalism.18 The federal government, through the Governor in Council, appoints all the judges
of the Supreme Court, and the Governor in Council is not required to consult or seek the
approval of the provinces.19 There is a requirement that three judges be from Quebec,20 which
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SPRY, supra note 13, at 15.
Gilberto Marcos Antonio Rodrigues ET AL., The Supreme Federal Court of Brazil: Protecting Democracy and
Centralized Power in COURTS IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES: FEDERALISTS OR UNITARISTS? 116 (Nicholas Aroney &
John Kincaid eds., 2017).
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Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, s 4(2).
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Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c S-26, s 6.
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provides minimal provincial representation. However, this level of representation does not rise
put Canada into the indirect role or high input categories.
E. Comoros
Other countries appear to allow states to have input into the appointment of justices or
judges onto their highest courts, but in practice the central or federal government holds the
power. Comoros provides an example of this. The Constitutional Court of Comoros decides
federal disputes. 21 According to the Comoros Constitution, “The President of the Union, the
Vice Presidents of the Union, the President of the Assembly of the Union, and the heads of the
island executives shall each appoint one member to the Constitutional Court.”22 This
appointment mechanism suggests that the heads of the three islands (the states essentially) can
control membership to this court. However, the president has the ability to suspend this court
entirely from operation, so any input from the states is not meaningful. In a 2018 referendum, for
example, the president abolished the Constitutional Court, and transferred its competencies to a
new chamber of the Supreme Court without any input from the state.23 Thus, Comoros on paper
allows for state input, but its corrupt government and other structural features do not allow the
states to have meaningful input through representation on the Constitutional Court to settle
federal disputes.
F. Ecuador
Ecuador is a federal country that has experienced tremendous change in its judiciary over
the past 15 years. As created by the 2008 Constitution, the Constitutional Court appears to

21

Comoros Const. 2001. Revised 2009. art. 36.
Id.
23
AFP, Comoros President Suspends Constitutional Court, The Independent, April 19, 2018;
https://www.independent.co.ug/comoros-president-suspends-constitutional-court/.
22
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answer questions of federalism, but the Court is still relatively new.24 The first Court took office
in November 2012 after an interim court presided from 2008–2012.25 The Court has nine
members that hold office for nine years.26 The justices of the Court are elected from candidates
submitted “by a qualification commission comprised of two persons appointed by each of the
following branches of government: the legislative, the executive, and transparency and social
monitoring.” 27 The justices are elected “through a public examination process, with citizen
oversight and option for challenging the process.” 28 Three of the nine justices have to be
replaced every three years. The Court has already been criticized for being aligned politically
with the President.
This process seemingly allows for no meaningful input from state governments. The
federal National Assembly is a unicameral body that is directly elected, and the transparency and
social monitoring body, The Council of Citizen Participation and Social Control, does not have
any members from state government. For example, the Transitional Council of Citizen
Participation and Social control was made up of seven councilors, whom were elected by the
Legislative Power between a list of candidates proposed by the President.29 The only potential
state-input would be through the executive branch of government, which consists of the
president, the vice president, the ministers of state and their subordinate officials, and Conade,
but the President appears to dominate this process.

24

ECUADOR: CONSTITUTION [ECUADOR], 2008, art. 436.
Jose Luis Castro-Montero and Gijs van Dijck, Judicial Politics in Unconsolidated Democracies: An Empirical
Analysis of the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court (2008–2016), 380–98, Jun 2, 2017.
26
ECUADOR: CONSTITUTION [ECUADOR], 2008, art. 432.
27
ECUADOR: CONSTITUTION [ECUADOR], 2008, art. 434.
28
ECUADOR: CONSTITUTION [ECUADOR], 2008, art. 434.
29
2018 Transitional Council of Citizen Participation and Social Control, General Coordination of International
Relations, (2018); http://www.cpccs.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/PRESENTACION-1.pdf.
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G. India
Other courts are even farther removed from provincial influence. In India for example,
many argue that the Supreme Court has become self-appointing.30 The president of India
appoints the Supreme Court justices after consulting with the Supreme Court’s justices and the
high courts that sit on the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC). The Supreme
Court of India settles federal disputes; it is the highest court in India and final arbiter even
though High Courts can answer constitutional questions as well.31
Justices of the Supreme Court are appointed by the president of India after the president
consults with justices of the Supreme Court and the high courts that sit on the National Judicial
Appointments Commission (NJAC).32 According to the India Constitution, the NJAC is meant to
be comprised of the Chief Justice of India; two other senior Judges of the Supreme Court; the
Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice; and two eminent persons to be nominated by the
committee consisting of the Prime Minister, the Chief Justice of India and the Leader of
Opposition in the House of the People.33 However, the Supreme Court ruled that the president
cannot appoint judges to the Supreme Court unless the appointee conforms to the “collective
recommendation” of the chief justice of India and four of his senior-most colleagues.34 Thus, the
members of the Supreme Court have the greatest weight in this appointment process, and
whether the president appoints the member or the members appoint future members, the states
are not given any meaningful input.

30

Manish Tewari & Rekha Saxena, The Supreme Court of India: The Rise of Judicial Power and the Protection of
Federalism in COURTS IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES: FEDERALISTS OR UNITARISTS? 241 (Nicholas Aroney & John
Kincaid eds., 2017).
31
Id. at 240.
32
INDIA CONST. art. 124, § 2.
33
INDIA CONST. art. 124A.
34
Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v. Union of India, 1993 (4) SCC 441; A.I.R. 1994 SC 268.
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H. Malaysia
Malaysia’s appointment system is centralized on the federal executive; although, it does
allow for a small amount of state input. Formal approval or confirmation by state actors is not
needed, however, which is why Malaysia is not in the category in which states play an indirect
role.
Malaysia’s Supreme Court, the Federal Court, decides disputes about federalism.35
The Federal Court is comprised of a Chief Justice, the President of the Court of Appeal, the
Chief Judges of the High Courts, and four to eleven other judges.36 This structure allows for
some provincial input in that there are two High Courts that serve different geographical areas;
the High Court of Malaya for the states of Peninsular Malaysia and the High Court of Sabah and
Sarawak for the Borneo states.37 Each High Court has a Chief Judge, and the independence of the
High Court of Sabah and Sarawak is of particular importance to the identity of the Borneo
states.38
The Yang di-Pertuan Agong or King appoints members of the Federal Court. The King
acts on the advice of the Prime Minster, after consulting the Conference of Rulers, when
appointing the Chief Justice and other members of the Court.39 Before the Prime Minister gives
the King advice on whom to appoint as members of the Court, he or she consults with the Chief
Justice of the Federal Court. The Conference of Rulers is made up of nine rulers of the Malay
states, and the governors of the other four states.40 Thus, the states have minimal input into the

35

CONSTITUTION OF MALAYSIA (1957, rev. 2007), art. 128.
Id. at art. 122.
37
Yvonne Tew, The Malaysian Legal System: A Tale of Two Courts, Georgetown University Law Center 1, 4
(2011).
38
Id.
39
CONSTITUTION OF MALAYSIA , supra note 37, at art. 122b.
40
CONSTITUTION OF MALAYSIA (1957, rev. 2007), Id. at art. 38.
36
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appointment process through the Conference of Rulers. The Conference of Rulers does not have
to approve appointees. Overall, the combination of High Court Chief Judges and consultation
from the Conference of Rulers provides states with an opportunity to weigh in on the
appointment of Justices to the Federal Court, but state governmental bodies do not have enough
impact to put Malaysia into the categories in which state actors can directly or indirectly appoint
justices.
I. Mexico
Mexico’s appointment mechanisms allow the federal Senate to appoint members of the
court from candidates chosen by the president; thus, one federal entity checks the power of the
other. The Supreme Court of Justice decides issues of federalism in Mexico.41 The President
submits a list of three candidates for Justices of the Supreme Court of Justice to the Senate,
which is the federal legislature's upper house.42 The Senate then has the power to appoint
Justices from that list or it can reject the list. If the Senate rejects the list of three, then the
President must submit a new list.43 This process allows for no input from the state government.
J. Pakistan
The appointment procedures in Pakistan involve one federal body checking the power of
another federal body following consultation with a commission comprised of members and
former members of the Supreme Court.
In Pakistan, the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in any issue between the
provincial governments or between the provincial governments and the federal government.44

41

Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CP, art. 105, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 0502-1917, 2015 ( Mex.).
42
Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CP, art. 76, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 05-021917, 2015 ( Mex.).
43
Id. at art. 96.
44
PAKISTAN CONST. art. 184, § 1.
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The President appoints all Supreme Court judges following nomination from the Parliamentary
Committee.45 The Parliamentary Committee is comprised of four members of the Senate, the
upper house of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament), and four members of the National Assembly, the
lower house, for each vacant position on the Supreme Court that needs to be filled.46 All
members of Parliament are directly elected based on provincial jurisdictions.47 Each
Parliamentary Committee member is nominated by the Judicial Commission of Pakistan.48 The
Judicial Commission of Pakistan is made up of the Chief Justice of Pakistan (the most senior
Judge of the Supreme Court); four most senior Judges of the Supreme Court; a former Chief
Justice or a former Judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan who is nominated by the Chief
Justice of Pakistan; the Federal Minister for Law and Justice; the Attorney-General for Pakistan;
and a Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court who is nominated by the Pakistan Bar Council.49
Thus, the appointment process for members of the Supreme Court is entirely led by federal
actors. The current and former members of the Court play a large role in this process. This
process allows for three federal agencies to check each other, but it does not allow for any input
from state government actors.
K. Serbia
Serbia's appointment mechanism allows one branch of the federal government to check
the power of another branch, but it does not allow for any input from the state government. The
Constitutional Court of Serbia decides federal disputes.50 The Constitutional Court has fifteen

45

Id. at art. 177.
Id. at art. 175A, § 9.
47
Senate of Pakistan, http://www.senate.gov.pk/en/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2020); National Assembly of Pakistan,
http://www.na.gov.pk/en/content (last visited Mar. 8, 2020).
48
PAKISTAN CONST. art. 175A.
49
PAKISTAN CONST. art. 175A.
50
The Republic of Serbia, the Constitutional Court, http://www.ustavni.sud.rs/page/view/ (last visited Jan. 17,
2020).
46
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justices. Five justices are appointed by the National Assembly, which is the unicameral
legislature of Serbia.51 The 250 seats of the National Assembly are filled through closed-party
list, proportional voting where the whole country is one electoral district.52 However, the five
justices appointed by the National Assembly must be among ten candidates proposed by the
President.53 The President appoints five additional justices, and the final five justices are
appointed at the general session of the Supreme Court of Cassation.54 The President of the
Republic must appoint justices from among ten candidates proposed by the National Assembly.55
The states do not have a large influence in this process, considering all of the justices are
appointed by federal bodies.
L. South Africa
South Africa's central government holds the most power in the appointment of justices to
its Constitutional Court. The South African Constitutional Court decides issues of federalism,
specifically disputes between the central government and provinces.56 The President of the
Republic appoints the Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court
after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission and the leaders of the political parties in
the National Assembly.57 The President also appoints the other nine judges on the Court after
advisement from the Chief Justice and party leaders represented in the National Assembly. The
President has to select the remaining nine judges from a list prepared by the Judicial Service

51

Serbia Const. 2006. art. 172.
National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, http://www.parlament.gov.rs/national-assembly/ (last visited Jan.
18, 2020).
53
Serbia Const. 2006. art. 172.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Adem Kassie Abebe, Umpiring Federalism in Africa: Institutional Mosaic and Innovations, 13 African Stud.
Quarterly 53, 64 (2013).
57
S. AFR. CONST., 1996. Chapter 8. 174.
52
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Commission, but he or she can determine that the list is unacceptable.58 The states thus have a
small amount of input through party leaders in the National Assembly. Still, this level of
representation is not meaningful when the provinces are represented more fully through the
Council of Provinces. The Council of Provinces has four permanent delegates in the Judicial
Service Commission, which provides the list of nominees.59 However, this level of input does
not rise to the level of states playing an indirect role because it only represents the input of four
provinces maximum. The central government appoints Constitutional Court Members without
any formal, direct involvement from the provinces and with very little involvement from the
Council of Provinces.
M. Spain
Spain's appointment mechanisms do not allow for meaningful state input. However,
Spain's system requires that one federal body check another during the appointment process
while also allowing nominations by a body outside the federal government.
The Constitutional Court of Spain answers questions of federalism.60 The King ultimately
appoints judges to the Constitutional Court after receiving nominations from four different
groups. Of the twelve members of the Court, Congress nominates four judges by a three-fifths
majority of its members, the Senate nominates four by a three-fifths majority, the General
Council of the Judicial Power nominates two, and the Government nominates two.61 The
"Government" refers to the Head of Government and Ministers. The Prime Minister appoints the
Ministers.62

58

Id.
Abebe, supra note 58, at 65.
60
CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA, B.O.E. n. 123, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain).
61
CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA, B.O.E. n. 159, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain).
62
CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA, B.O.E. n. 112, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain).
59

12

All members of Congress are directly elected. There are two seats in Congress for each
province, and the remaining seats are distributed in proportion to the respective population.63
Every province directly elects four members of the Senate.64 Thus, there is no state government
representation in this appointment process through the Congress or Senate.
The General Council of the Judiciary is an autonomous body composed of judges and
other jurists, who exercise government functions within the Judiciary to guarantee the
independence of the judges.65 Of the twelve General Council members who must be judges or
magistrates, Congress elects six and the Senate elects six from a list of thirty-six candidates
proposed by associations of judges or by non-associate judges.66 Of the eight members who must
be lawyers or jurists, four of them are elected by the Congress and four by the Senate. This
appointment process allows one branch of the federal government to check another and allows
independent stakeholders outside of the federal government to nominate two members. Yet, the
states still have no meaningful role in selecting judges for the Constitutional Court.
N. Switzerland
There is no meaningful input from state governments in the appointment of Federal
Supreme Court Judges in Switzerland. Switzerland is a federal country comprised of twenty-six
cantons and over two thousand municipalities.67 The Federal Supreme Court is the highest court
in the country and decides questions of federalism.68 However, the Federal Supreme Court is

63

Congress, http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2020); Senado de España,
http://www.senado.es/web/conocersenado/temasclave/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2020).
64
Congress, http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2020).
65
General Council of the Judiciary, http://noticias.juridicas.com/base_datos/Admin/lo2-2001.html (last visited Jan.
19, 2020).
66
Id.
67
Andreas Lienhard et al., The Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland: Judicial Balancing of Federalism without
Judicial Review in COURTS IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES: FEDERALISTS OR UNITARISTS? 404 (Nicholas Aroney & John
Kincaid eds., 2017); BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV][CONSTITUTION] Apr. 1999, SR art. 1, 53 (Switz.).
68
BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV][CONSTITUTION] Apr. 1999, SR art. 189, para 2 (Switz.).
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unusual in that it does not have judicial review of the constitutionality of federal laws. It settles
disputes between the confederation and cantons or between cantons.69 Thus, if a federal law
violates the principles of federalism, the court must still apply it.70 The Federal Assembly, the
federal parliament, appoints all Federal Supreme Court Judges.71 These appointments consider
"linguistic, regional and technical criteria and voluntarily takes account of the proportional
representation claims of the major political parties," yet the judges are generally perceived as
independent.72 Judges on the Federal Supreme Court only serve six-year terms.73 All members of
both houses of the bicameral Federal Assembly are directly elected by geographic region; thus,
the canton governments have no say in the appointment process.
O. United States of America
The United States' system is very similar to that of Argentina and Brazil. The Supreme
Court of the United States decides questions of federalism.74 Supreme Court Justices are
nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. There must be a simple majority in
favor of the candidate in the Senate.75 Each state is represented by two individuals in the
Senate.76 The President cannot appoint a justice to the Supreme Court without Senate approval,
but state governments are not involved in any part of this process.

69

Andreas Lienhard et al., The Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland: Judicial Balancing of Federalism without
Judicial Review in COURTS IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES: FEDERALISTS OR UNITARISTS? 416 - 417 (Nicholas Aroney &
John Kincaid eds., 2017); BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV][CONSTITUTION] Apr. 1999, SR art. 190 (Switz.).
70
Id. at 420.
71
Id. at 417.
72
The Courts of Switzerland, https://www.bger.ch/index/federal/federal-inherit-template/federal-richter.htm (last
visited Jan. 1, 2021).
73
BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV][CONSTITUTION] Apr. 1999, SR art. 145 (Switz.).
74
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
75
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, cl. 2.
76
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
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P. Venezuela
The last country addressed in this category, Venezuela, provides an example of how one
branch of the federal government can gain control over the judiciary and questions of federalism.
The Venezuelan judiciary has been in flux over the past few years. The current top court is
unclear. However, it is clear that the President has been able to use the court for his personal
gain, and the courts have largely been viewed as an arm of the executive branch.
The current Constitution of Venezuela has not been able to guard against the executive
takeover of the judiciary. According to the 1999, 2009 Revised Constitution, the Supreme
Tribunal of Justice is the highest court. It has thirty-two justices (“(“magistrados”) that the
National Assembly elects for a single twelve-year term.77 The National Assembly is one of two
law-making bodies in Venezuela, though its power has waned over time. Each state directly
votes for at least three representatives in the National Assembly.78 The National Assembly
appoints justices to the Supreme Tribunal of Justice following recommendations from the
Committee for Judicial Postulations.79 The Committee for Judicial Postulations gathers
information on potential candidates by meeting with organizations that focus on legal issues and
prioritize citizen power.80 On paper, the National Assembly provides input into judicial
appointment, which spreads the power of appointment across two federal bodies. In reality,
however, the executive branch has been able to use the judiciary to its advantage.81 Regardless,
state governments have no impact on the appointment process.

77

Venezuela Const. 1999. Revised 2009. art. 264; Antonio Ramirez, An Introduction to Venezuelan Governmental
Institutions and Primary Legal Sources (May 2006), https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Venezuela.html.
78
Venezuela Const. 1999. Revised 2009. art. 186.
79
Antonio Ramirez, An Introduction to Venezuelan Governmental Institutions and Primary Legal Sources (May
2006), https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Venezuela.html.
80
Id.
81
David Smilde, Venezuela’s Other Crisis: A Justice System Dismantled from Within, World Politics Review, Feb.
10, 2015.
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Countries in which states are perceived to have little or no power in the appointment of
members to the highest courts on questions of federalism are those in which the state legislatures
or state governments play no role or a very minor role in these processes. Countries in which
state governments play a minor role include Canada, Comoros, Malaysia, and South Africa. The
countries in this section are characterized by strong federal or central governments, and some are
characterized by judiciaries that lack independence.
II.

COUNTRIES IN WHICH STATE GOVERNMENT PLAYS AN INDIRECT ROLE

The second group of countries is the one in which state governmental approval or input is
required. State governments, through representatives on federal bodies, have to select the
candidates for federal executive approval or approve the federal executive’s appointees, thus
acting indirectly. This system provides states with meaningful input, but that input is not as
strong as the input from the states in group three, because the states' representatives are not
directly placing individuals onto the courts. These countries include: Austria, Belgium, the
Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates.
A. Austria
The Constitutional Court of Austria decides questions of federalism.82 The Constitutional
Court consists of a president, a vice-president, and twelve other members, as well as six
substitute members. Members and substitute members are appointed by the Federal President,
who is directly elected.83 The Federal Government can make proposals for the position of
President and Vice-President.84 The six remaining members and three substitute members of the

82

Johannes Oehlboeck & Immanuel Gerstner, The Austrian Legal System and Laws: a Brief Overview,
https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2020).
83
Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz [B-VG][Constitution] 2013, art. 147, ¶¶ 1–2.
84
Constitutional Judges: Overview, https://www.vfgh.gv.at/verfassungsgerichtshof/verfassungsrichter/ (last visited
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Court are nominated partly by the National Council and partly by the Federal Council.85 The
National Council is the lower house of parliament, and members of the National Council are
elected through forty-three local electoral districts.86 Political parties submit separate ranked lists
of candidates for each regional or local district where they have chosen to run. They also submit
a federal-level list.
The Federal Council is the upper house of the Austrian Parliament, representing the nine
Austrian states on a federal level.87 The Provincial Diets of the nine Federal Provinces delegate
members to the Federal Council to represent the interests of their provinces in the federal
legislative process. Thus, the Federal Council is the mouthpiece for the states in the appointment
process. The Federal President has the final say on who becomes a member of the Constitutional
Court, but there is still meaningful input from the states in this capacity.
B. Belgium
Belgium is a federal country made up of three communities and three regions that are
based on linguistic differences.88 The Constitutional Court decides questions of federalism89 and
has been described as "an important safeguard for the autonomy of the federated entities."90
There are twelve judges total on the Court, but it generally hears cases by a panel consisting of
the two Presidents, one Dutch-speaking and one French-speaking, and five judges.91 At the
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beginning of each annual session, the Presidents create a list to make the panel. The appointment
process allows for the states to play a significant indirect role.
The King appoints judges of the Court for life after nomination from lists of two
candidates submitted alternatively by the Senate and the House of Representatives.92 The lists
have to be passed by a two-thirds majority in each house. Six judges must speak Dutch, and six
must speak French. One of the judges must have adequate knowledge of German, and each
language group elects its President. Thus, the judges are selected, in part, to reflect the range of
political views in the federal Parliament.93
The Chamber of Representatives does not provide for any state input into the
appointment process because its members are directly elected. The Senate creates an indirect
way for state governments to have significant input into the appointment process. There are fifty
“"substate senators” " who are members of a substate parliament and of the Senate and ten “"coopted senators” " who are appointed by substate senators. As of May 25, 2014, for example, the
Senate had one senator who was appointed by the Parliament of the German-speaking
community, two who were appointed by the French-speaking group of the Brussels-Capital
Parliament, eight who were appointed by the Walloon Parliament, ten appointed by the
Parliament of the French Community, and twenty-nine who were appointed by the Flemish
Parliament.94 While the Belgium Senate is similar to the German Bundesrat, Belgium's
appointment process still requires the King's final approval, and so the states are not directly
appointing judges. However, since the Senate is a direct mouthpiece for the states and the Senate
creates their own list of nominees, the states play a larger role in Belgium than in the Congo.
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C. The Republic of Congo
The Republic of the Congo (Congo) is a federal country in which the Constitutional Court
decides issues of federalism.95 The state governments play a small, indirect role in appointing the
judges of the Court through their election of members of a federal body. The Constitutional Court
is comprised of nine judges. The President appoints three judges without any formal
recommendations required, three judges that are nominated by the Senate and National Assembly,
and three judges that are nominated by the Judicial Service Council (JSC).96
The JSC is comprised of public prosecutors and judicial officers, representing all the court
levels, which provides for some input from the states but no meaningful input from state
governments. The National Assembly is directly elected, which does not create an avenue for state
input. However, the 108 members of the Senate are elected by provincial assembly members,
which are members of the state legislatures. Thus, state government is represented in this
appointment process by the Senate. Because state government actors do not actually serve in the
federal legislature, the Congo is more like Austria than Germany. The state governments choose
who will serve in the Senate.
The role of state government is not large here; the Senate and National Assembly nominate
only three judges for the Court, and they vote as one body for this process. Further, the president
has final say, but the state legislatures do have an avenue for influencing this process. The first
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Constitutional Court appointed under this structure took office in July 2014; thus, this structure is
relatively new and could change over time.
D. Nigeria
Nigeria’s large Supreme Court is selected in a manner that requires the federal executive to
obtain approval by the federal legislature. However, Nigeria falls into the states as indirect
appointers category because the state judiciaries play a critical role in the appointment process.
In this way, Nigeria is more similar to Austria than to the United States, yet Nigeria does not
allow state governments to directly appoint members of the court like Ethiopia does.
The Federal Supreme Court of Nigeria handles federalism disputes.97 The Federal Supreme
Court is composed of a Chief Justice and a maximum of twenty-six other Justices as determined
by an Act of the National Assembly. The National Assembly is comprised of the Senate and the
House of Representatives.98 Three representatives from each state and one representative from
the federal territory of Abuja make up the Senate. The House of Representatives has 360
members. The number of members of the House of Representatives is in proportion to the
members’ constituencies.99
The Justices of the Federal Supreme Court are nominated by the President of Nigeria, based
on the recommendations of the National Judicial Council. The National Judicial Council consists
of five Chief Judges of States, which guarantees the state judiciaries are represented, because the
National Judicial Council presents candidates to the President.100 The President’s nominees must
then be confirmed by the Senate in order to be fully appointed.101 Thus, the federal Senate
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checks the power of the President, but the state judiciaries also provide input through the
National Judicial Council.
E. Russia
Russia’s appointment mechanisms allow states to give input through their federal
mouthpieces near the end of the selection process. The Russian Constitution allows the
Constitutional Court to arbitrate disputes between Moscow and the regional and local
governments.102 The president nominates candidates to the Constitutional Court, and then the
Federation Council or Council of Federation appoints candidates.103 The Federation Council is
the upper house of the Federal Assembly, Russia’s parliament.104 Thus, the head the of the
federal government selects the pool of candidates without input from the states, but the states are
represented in the Federation Council. The Federation Council has two representatives from each
state-like body in Russia; one representative is selected from the region’s legislative body, and
one is appointed by the governor of the region.105 The states are acting in an indirect, gatekeeper
role. The president can pick the candidates but the states, through their representatives on the
Federation Council, get to select who is ultimately appointed.
F. United Arab Emirates
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federal country comprised of seven emirates.106 The
appointment procedures to the UAE’s highest court allow for significant indirect state input.
The highest court in the UAE is the Federal Supreme Court and it decides questions of
federalism.107 The Federal Supreme Court has a Chief Justice and up to five judges; the judges
are appointed by the federal President after the approval of the Supreme Council.108 “The Federal
Supreme Council is the highest authority in the UAE,” and it is made up of “the Rulers of all the
member Emirates of the UAE.”109 The Rulers are the highest executives from each of the
Emirates, and the President is elected from the Rulers. The Rulers are absolute monarchs who
are not elected. Thus, each state is directly represented by their highest executive on the Supreme
Council. The emirates’ input in the appointment of judges is still indirect because the President
has the final say, but the Supreme Council’s approval is required.
Austria, Belgium, the Congo, Nigeria, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates all allow
states to act in an indirect role during the appointment of justices or judges to their courts that
decide federal questions.
III.

COUNTRIES WITH A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF STATE INPUT IN THE APPOINTMENT
PROCESS

Very few countries allow the states to have a notably large role in the appointment process
beyond an indirect role. Having a large role in appointment would look like allowing state
legislatures, judiciaries, or executives to directly appoint justices. Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Comoros, Germany, and Ethiopia fall into this category of countries.

106

Functions of the Federal Supreme Court, https://www.tamimi.com/law-update-articles/functions-of-the-federalsupreme-court/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2021).
107
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: CONSTITUTION [UNITED ARAB EMIRATES], 2 December 1971, art. 99.
108
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: CONSTITUTION [UNITED ARAB EMIRATES], 2 December 1971, art. 96.
109
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: CONSTITUTION [UNITED ARAB EMIRATES], 2 December 1971, art. 46.

22

A. Bosnia and Herzegovina
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Constitutional Court decides questions regarding
federalism.110 The Constitutional Court is made up of four members selected by the House of
Representatives of the Federation, two members selected by the Assembly of the Republika
Srpska, and three members selected by the President of the European Court of Human Rights.111
The members selected by the President of the European Court of Human Rights can only be
selected following consultation with the Presidency.112 Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of one
unitary (The Republic of Srpska) and one federative (The Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina) unit.113 The House of Representatives of the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina is the lower house and legislative body of the Parliament of the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina,114 and the National Assembly of Republic of Srpska is the legislative
body of the Republika Srpska115; thus, the two regions have a say in the selection of justices.
Bosnia and Herzegovina provides an example of a country in which the legislative branches
of state governments directly appoint members to the highest courts. This creates a check on
central power and an avenue for addressing the concerns, because the members of the House of
Representatives of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of National Assembly of
Republic of Srpska are elected by citizens in each region.
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B. Comoros
As mentioned above, the Constitution of Comoros allows for state input into the
appointment of members to its Constitutional Court, which decides federal disputes. The heads
of the island executives appoint one member to the Constitutional Court, while the President of
the Union, the Vice Presidents of the Union, and the President of the Assembly of the Union
appoint the other members of the court. This would in theory give the islands significant
influence on the highest court in the country. However, the current standing and jurisdiction of
the Constitutional Court of Comoros are not clear116; thus, the islands’ level of input on questions
of federalism is ambiguous.
C. Ethiopia
Ethiopia’s “court” appointment mechanisms create regional power and influence by having a
unique body answer questions of federalism. In Ethiopia, a court does not decide issues of
federalism, but a body of parliament does.117 The House of Federation (HoF) settles
constitutional disputes, including disputes between the federal government and the states and
disputes between the states.118 The HoF is composed of representatives of nations, nationalities,
and ethnic groups. The ethnic groups are not represented equally in HoF; the largest ethnic
groups have proportionately higher representation than other groups, but every ethnic group has
at least one representative.119
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The members of the HoF are solely nominated by the legislative councils of the states,120
which gives the states a great amount of input into the appointment process. The states can elect
members to the HoF, but this has never been done before. The federal government plays a very
small role in the composition of the HoF; it can appoint a few members of the Council of
Constitutional Inquiry. 121 The Council of Constitutional Inquiry, which is made up of legal
experts, assists the HoF in determining whether there is need for constitutional interpretation. If
interpretation is needed, the Council makes recommendations. However, the HoF is not bound
by recommendations from the council.122
Through this unique body, Ethiopia creates opportunities for different ethnic groups, nations,
and nationalities to be directly represented when deciding questions of federalism.
D. Germany
Germany allows input into its appointment process from members of the various Land (state)
governments. The Constitutional Court of Germany decides issues relating to federalism.123 The
Federal Constitutional Court consists of federal judges and other members; half of the members
are elected by the Bundestag and half by the Bundesrat.124 Justices of the Court may not be
members of the Bundestag, of the Bundesrat, or of the Federal Government.125 The German
Federal Parliament is a bicameral legislature that is made up of the directly elected Bundestag
and the appointed Bundesrat.126 The Bundesrat functions as the federal states’ mouthpiece into
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the appointment process. The Bundesrat representatives are appointed by the 16 federal states of
Germany governments.127 Thus, two federal bodies appoint members of the court, but one of
these federal bodies is comprised of members of the state governments.
This is the second smallest category of appointment mechanisms. In between the spectrum of
little to no meaningful state involvement to high state involvement lies the third category of
countries in which state approval is necessary for appointment but not as powerful as the second
category of countries.
CONCLUSION
Countries that allow state governmental bodies to provide substantial input into the
appointment process of justices are few and far between. However, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Comoros, Ethiopia and Germany provide some guidance. Regions or states can also influence
the outcome on questions of federalism by playing an indirect role in the appointment of judges
or justices to constitutional or supreme courts. This can be seen in Austria, Congo, Nigeria, and
Russia. The majority of countries allocate the power of appointment to the federal or central
government, but even within this structure some provincial influence can be found. This can be
observed in Canada, Malaysia, and South Africa. All three categories illuminate possibilities for
appointing justices to courts that decide questions of federalism.
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